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I INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increasing secularisation of Western death culture, traditional death rituals 
such as burial of the deceased's body and attending the burial site continue to be of 
significant social importance. 1 The act of burial is of particular importance in death 
rituals for two reasons. Firstly, burial "represents a social marking and recognition of 
the ending of a life"2 and secondly, it acts as reassurance for living people that they 
too may have some control over their own burial when they die.3 
Since September 2007, the New Zealand media has reported three high profile cases 
of "body-snatching" which involved the unauthorised removal and retention of the 
deceased's body by a Maori family member in disagreement of the proposed burial 
arrangements. 4 The three cases highlighted the difficulties encountered when the 
executor or administrator of the deceased attempted to recover the body for burial. It 
has been acknowledged that, in such circumstances an executor's common law right 
to possession of the body may be insufficient to achieve the deceased's burial wishes.
5 
In response to this, the Bill of Rights I Human Rights division of the Ministry of 
Justice are seeking to evaluate the adequacies of the current legal mechanisms for 
effecting burial wishes. 6 In addition to this, some relevant professionals have 
subsequently proposed vesting property rights in an executor as a viable means of 
. . 7 
secunng possess10n. 
1 Daniel Miller and Fiona Parrot, "Death, Ritual and Material Culture in South London" in Belinda 
Brooks-Gordon and others (eds) Death Rites and Righ ts (Hart, Oxford, 2007) 150 
2 Belinda Brooks, Gordon (ed), Death Rites and Rights above n I, l 
3 Lisa Owen "Stand Off After Body Snatch" (6 March 2008) 6pm One News Report 
4 The case of James Takamore was reported by Martin Van Bcyncn "Famil y split over body's removal" 
( 15 September 2007) The Press Christchurch at http://www.stuff.co .nz; The case ofl vy May Ngahooro 
was reported by Belinda Feek "S natched ' body returned to family: Injunction makes body snatching 
burial 'criminal act" (07 March 2008) The Dominion Post Wellington at http://www.stuff.co .nz; the 
case of Tina Marshall was reported by Ben Fawkes "Family irate as father takes body" ( 13 December 
2007) The Dominion Post Wellington at http ://www. stuff.co.nz. 
5 Interview with Dr Cordelia Thomas, Senior-Legal Advisor for the New Zealand Bioethics Council 
(Kathryn Ryan , Nine to Noon, National - Radio New Zealand, I O March 2008) at 
http://www.radionz.co. nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon ; also sec Sir Geoffrey Palmer's statement 
in "Body snatching case leads to review" (21 February 2008) The Press Christchurch at 
www.stuff.co.nz 
6Charlotte Boyer, Policy Analyst, for the Ministry of Justice, "Re: Property rights in human ti ssue/ 
"body-snatching"" (9 July 2008) Email 
7 Interview of Simon Manning, Funeral Director of Seddon Park Funeral Parlour (P ippa Wetze l, TV 
One Breakfast, 7 March 2008) at http://tvnz.co. nz/contcnt 
1 
This paper will, firstly, seek to examine the legal ability of a testator to achieve his or 
her burial wishes. It will examine the nature of an executor's common law right to 
possession of the body with regards to the statutory regimes which become operative 
at the time of death such as the Coroners Act 2006 and the Administration Act 1969. 
It will also examine the nature of the executor' s right to possession against the 
conflicting opinions of relatives. Subsequently, it will show that, even in cases where 
there is no dispute between family members, there are many factors which may limit 
the ability of a testator's to achieve his or her burial interest. A testator's burial 
interest is often subject to public interest and to the interests of his or her family. 
Secondly, it will argue that when a body is removed and retained by a third party 
without authorisation, the legal rights given to an executor are insufficient to achieve 
the burial wishes of the deceased. 
Thirdly, it will examine whether vesting property rights in the body is an appropriate 
means of achieving the testator's burial wishes. Upon examination of some of the key 
property paradigms, this paper will conclude that, although the human body does not 
automatically fall outside the common law description of property; according property 
rights in a corpse may prove problematic in practice. 
Before proceeding with this paper, one must acknowledge the inaccuracy of "body-
snatching" as a means of describing the unauthorised removal of a deceased family-
member' s body for burial. In contrast to the original "body-snatching" cases of the 
18th and 19th Century for anatomical study, the three aforementioned cases of removal 
were motivated by grief, not by greed. Such an evocative term is, therefore, 
obstructive to a proper legal analysis of the current issue. 
2 
II THE LEGAL ABILITY OF A TESTATOR TO ACHIEVE HIS OR HER 
BURIAL WISHES 
A Introduction 
Belinda Brooks suggests that how society views death is determined by the legal 
rights conferred in regard to the treatment of the corpse after death.
8 In New Zealand 
and throughout Western legal systems, liberal philosophy has essentially given rise to, 
and justifies the right of a living individual to have some degree of control over 
matters such as distribution of his or her estate and burial of his or her body once they 
die.9 
Accordingly, the law has provided the testamentary instrument of a 'will' which 
creates and enforces this liberal concept of the 'individual'. As Sarah Cooper 
suggests, the creation of a will is "an act of faith in one's legal system that is founded 
upon the concept of the individual subject."
10 A will is a document which is legally 
capable of disposing of a testator's property.
11 In order to have this legal capacity, a 
will must fulfil certain statutory criteria; it must appoint an executor, 
12 the testator 
must have reached full capacity, 
13 and the will must satisfy specific statutory 
formalities. 14 
As the common law prescribes, the authorised executor of a will must, as his or her 
principle duty, "propound and maintain"
15 the wishes of the deceased as evidenced by 
his or her will. Whilst this may include payment of debts and distribution of an estate 
amongst its heirs, it will also include the specific responsibility of organising burial of 
8 Belinda Brooks, Gordon (ed), Death Rites and Rights above n I , I 
9This is in contrast to according rights to a deceased person, Price highlights the substantial 
disagreement regarding the extent of a dead person 's ability to possess rights in David Price "Property, 
Harm and the Corpse" in Death Rites and Rights, above n I, 200 
10 Sarah Webster Cooper "Rites, Rights, Writing: Tintern Abbey" in Death Rites and Rights, above n I , 
136 
11 22. Instruments over which probate may be granted, (4) Instruments Entitled to Probate, Part I The 
Grant of Probate or Administration, Adminstration of Estates Vol I, The Laws of New Zealand as on 
the 28 August 2008 
12 See Re Leese (1862) 164 ER 1068; Re Hornbuckle (1890) 15 PD 149 
13 s.9( I) Wills Act 2007; a person must be over the age of 18 to create a will unless he or she satisfies 
any requirement under s.9(2)- (4) Wills Act 2007 
1
~ A will must be in writing, signed and witnessed in accordance with ss. J J - 12 Wills Act 2007 
15 N Richardson , Nevill's Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration (LcxisNcxis NZ, Wellington, 2004), 
485 
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the deceased. 16 Accordingly, the common law entitles an executor to possession of the 
body for the purpose of burial. 17 
B The Executor's Common Law Right to Possession 
1 An executor's right to possession will prevail over the wishes of relatives 
Subject to some statutory regimes which will be discussed shortly, an executor's 
common law right to possession is generally paramount when dealing with the body 
after death. 18 In cases where there is conflict between family members, funeral 
directors, for example, will view an executor's decision to be determinative of the 
"f" b . l 19 spec1 1c una arrangements. An example of this is the case of Grandison v 
Nembhard, where a testator's burial wishes were performed by his executor and later 
upheld by the courts against the wishes of the testator's daughter. Although this 
meant the body was to be transported from the United Kingdom back to the testator's 
country of origin, Jamaica, the executor has a "perfectly proper desire"20 to carry out 
the testator's wishes according to his will. As stipulated by Vinelott J; 
21 
... the executor must have a discretion as to the mode and place for the d isposal of the corpse 
of the deceased and that on ordinary principles the court will not interfere with the exercise o f 
that discretion unless it is exercised in a way which shows that he has not properly weighed 
the factors which ought to have been taken into accou nt in that it is wholly unreasonable. 
According to this statement, the courts cannot inte1fere with an executor in the 
performance of his or her testamentary duties, unless his or her actions are "wholly 
unreasonable." In light of the facts of the case, it appears as though the powers of the 
executor are very broad and the standard of unreasonableness is particularly high. In 
cases such as these, it is very likely that the testator will achieve his or her burial 
wishes. 
2 The Executor's highly discretionary power 
16 Re Stewart (2003] I NZLR 809 para [24] 
17 Williams v Williams 20 Ch D 659 
18 See Grandison v Nembhard 4 BMLR 140 (CD) Yinelott J 
19 lnterview of Simon Manning, Funeral Director of Seddon Park Funeral Parlour (Pippa Wetzel, TV 
One Breakfast, 7 March 2008) at http://tvnz.co.nz/content 
20 Grandison V Nembhard 4 BMLR 140 r para 221 as per Yinelott J 
21 Ibid 
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Whilst the right to possession of the body for the purpose of burial normally achieves 
the testator's burial wishes, an executor's power of interment is highly discretionary 
and the burial wishes of a deceased person are only perceived to be 'directional' when 
an executor is making burial arrangements.22 Because of this fact, an executor has the 
power to override the wishes of the deceased when deciding burial arrangements. 
This is evident in the historic case of Williams v Williams, where the courts denied 
reimbursement to a friend of the deceased who carried out his desired cremation after 
a burial was carried out by his executors: 23 
... the law in this country is clear, that after the death of a man, his executors have a right to the 
custody and possession of his body (although they have no property in it) until it is properly 
buried. 
This power, the courts explained, is not subject to any express wish of the deceased 
as any specification given is only a "direction which [can] not be enforced at law."24 
In his judgment, Kay J stated that the action failed for reasons which included the 
deceased's body was buried in accordance with his family's wishes, notwithstanding 
the fact that her own actions were fulfilling the deceased testamentary stipulations.25 
As Dr Cordelia Thomas, senior-legal advisor for the New Zealand Bioethics Council 
explains, it is likely the 'directional' nature of a testator's burial specifications is a 
policy consideration to prevent unreasonably lavish funerals which are beyond the 
means of the remaining estate. 26 Blackstone similarly stipulated that "[an executor] 
must bury the deceased in a manner suitable to the estate which he leaves behind. 
Necessary funeral expenses are allowed, previous to al1 other debts and charges ... "27 
In appears, however, that the case of Williams v Williams was not decided upon 
financial grounds, rather the form of interment proposed by the testator was not 
favoured by the family or society at the time.28 This demonstrates that, in cases where 
22 Williams v Williams above n 17 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26 Interview with Dr Cordelia Thomas, above n 5 
27 Williams Blackstone Commentaries on the laws of England, bk. 2, eh. 32, p. 508 
28 The courts seem to prefer an ecclesiastical interment for the deceased because it was in accordance 
with the prevailing Christian societal views of the time and because it was favoured by the deceased 's 
family; see Williams v Williams above n 17 
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the testator's burial wishes are against that of the family and are socially abnormal, 
the courts may uphold the executor's discretionary decision. 
Another reason why the executor is given a discretionary power of interment is that 
the common Jaw originally conferred this obligation of procuring a timely burial upon 
a deceased's executor as a means of ensuring public sanity.29 As a matter of public 
interest, it is important that an executor is provided with this discretionary power 
because it provides the means for a more efficacious interment. 
3 Human Tissue Act 2008 - statutory powers to achieve testamentary wishes 
The testamentary will may often include specific information regarding the use of the 
deceased's body tissue after he or she dies . It is valuable, therefore, to include the use 
of tissue and organ donation in an examination of the executor's testamentary powers. 
The recently enacted Human Tissue Act 2008 is one of the first statutory regimes to 
become operative after a person dies. The purpose of the Act is to regulate the 
coJJection and use of human tissue from an individual in accordance with the 
"autonomy and dignity of the individual"30 and the cultural and spiritual values of the 
individual's family. 31 It is important to recognise that this Act acknowledges the 
approval of both the deceased individual (as expressed when he or she was alive) and 
his or her family. 
The Act appears to create fairly sound measures for ensuring the interests of the 
deceased individual are upheld. Providing "informed consent" is given by the 
deceased individual in accordance with s.9(1) and s.31(2) of the Act, the deceased 's 
body may; undergo a post-mortem, be used for anatomical examination, research, 
public display, or in the development of therapeutic extracts.32 However, the 
definition of "informed consent" requires the deceased individual to have been aware 
of the nature of the use when he or she provided consent.33 So whilst the Act does 
29Interview with Dr Cordelia Thomas, Senior-Legal Advisor for the New Zealand Bioethics Council 
(Kathryn Ryan, Nine to Noon, National - Rad io New Zealand, I O March 2008) at 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninctonoon 
30 s.3(a)(i) Human Tissue Act 2008 
31 s.3(a)(ii) Human Tissue Act 2008 
32 s.6 Human Tissue Act 2008 
33 s.9( I )(a) Human Ti sue Act 2008 
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provide the deceased individual with a right to determine the use of his or her body 
tissue after death, it may be very difficult to obtain the exact consent required to 
satisfy section 9(1)(a). Alternatively, the deceased individual may nominate his or her 
executor to provide "informed consent" pursuant to s.31 (2)(b ). 34 It is only in the 
absence of these two scenarios that the deceased's family may legally "object"35 to the 
use of his or her body tissue. 
C Limitations to Achieving a Testator's Burial Wishes 
Whilst the executor's right to possession is usually sufficient for achieving the 
testamentary wishes of the deceased; the executor's right to possession is affected by 
statutory regimes which become active after death has ensued. 
1 The Coroners Act 2006 
The Coroners Act 2006 places limitations upon the executor's common law right to 
possession of a corpse. The statute accords the police and designated coroner the 
right of possession when death has ensued in any "reportable" circumstance.36 These 
include suicide, death in "unnatural or violent" circumstances, death whilst 
undergoing medical or dental treatment and death whilst in custody of a government 
agency exercising any of the specified statutory powers.37 According to section 18(1), 
possession by the police extends from when "a member of the police first suspects on 
reasonable grounds"38 that death occurred in any of the reportable circumstances 
prescribed until the body is reported to the designated coroner. Once this occurs, the 
coroner's right to possession operates until he or she orders the release of the body for 
b · l 39 una. Even once the body is returned to the executor after post-mortem, the 
Coroners Act 2006 allows for retention of body parts and samples providing the 
samples are "minute"40 or "necessary for the purpose of post-mortem,"41 and the 
family has been advised.42 
34 s.31 (2)(b) Human Tissue Act 2008 
35 This will override the consent required under s.31 (2)(c) 
36 s. 13( I) Coroners Act 2006 
37 Ibid. 
38 s.18( I) Coroners Act 2006 
39 s.19( I )(b) Coroners Act 2006 
40 s.48(2)(a) Coroners Act 2006 
41 s.48(2)(b) Coroners Act 2006 
42 s.50( I) Coroners Act 2006 
7 
2 The Administration Act 1969 
Even if the deceased's death does not warrant police or coroner custody, an executor's 
right to possession does not occur immediately upon death. Pursuant to the 
Administration Act 1969, an executor must apply to the High Court to make a grant of 
probate or letters of administration.43 Once this has occurred, the deceased's will and 
appointment of the executor will be legally valid providing the court exercises its 
discretionary power of appointment in accordance with the testator's will. 44 The Act is 
also important as it declares the continuing jurisdiction of the courts to appoint a 
testamentary administrator in cases where the deceased has died intestate.45 For the 
purpose of clarity, further references made to an "executor" will include an 
administrator who has been appointed by the courts, as their rights to the deceased's 
body are identical once administration has been granted.46 
3 The unauthorised removal and retention of a corpse - another limitation to the 
executor's right to possession 
The final way in which the burial wishes of a deceased person may fail to be fulfilled 
is if the executor attempts to realise such wishes but is subsequently impeded from 
doing because an unauthorised removal and retention of a corpse by a person has 
occurred. There is a legal explanation for the unauthorised removal of a body; it 
subsists in the absence of robust legal rights conferred to the executor for the purpose 
of recovering a corpse. 
The three recent cases of unauthorised removal and retention of a corpse were able to 
occur because executorial disputes are determined to be matters warranting a civil 
action.47 The police in all three cases were unable to intervene because no criminal 
offence exists pertaining to the removal of a body for an alternative burial. The only 
criminal offence relative to the treatment of human remains provides the police with a 
means of intervention should a party engage in "misconduct in respect of human 
43 s.5(2) Administration Act 1969 
44 s.6(1) Administration Act 1969; s.5 Principal duty of the Court, (I) Jurisdiction, The Grant of 
Probate Part I, Administration of Estates Vol I , The Laws of New Zealand (accessed on 28 August 
2008); s.5 Administration Act 1969 
45 s.6(1) Administration Act 1969 
46 Dr Cordelia Thomas Interview, above n 5 
47 Interview with Dr Cordelia Thomas, above n 5 
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remains."48 The provision's effect is confined to situations where the party fails to 
dispose of the body pursuant to his or her legal duty, or improperly interferes or offers 
indignity to human remains.49 Section 150 was not relevant to the removal of Tina 
Marshall's body, for example, because her father was not offering indignity to her 
body, rather that he disagreed with cremating her body and so attempted to bury her in 
keeping with traditional Maori practise.50 
The unauthorised removal and retention of a body cannot, therefore, become a 
criminal offence until the executor made an application for a court injunction. 51 Once 
a court injunction has been granted, the body may be exhumed. 52 Offences relating 
to the burial of a body pursuant to the Burial and Cremation Act 1964 are inadequate 
in achieving the burial wishes of the deceased because they focus on person who 
removes the body and his or her unlawful behaviour, and they require the body to 
have been already buried before an offence can be committed.53 For example, section 
55 creates an offence for the unlawful exhumation of a body which would be 
applicable in circumstances where the body is already buried. 54 But the provision 
focuses on the punishment a person will receive, rather than specifying an automatic 
right for an executor or administrator to recover the body via police intervention. 
Moreover, whilst the courts can provide the executor with a licence for exhumation, 
an executor still may not be able to achieve the intended interment service. In the 
case of Tina Marshall, for example, it was too late to have the body viewed by 
relatives by the time a licence for exhumation was granted.55 
48 Crimes Act I 96 I, s. I 50 
~
9 Crimes Act 1961, s. I 50 
50 Heather du Plessis-Allan "Feud Over Body Intensifies" ( 13 December 2007) 6pm One News Report; 
Tina's paternal family buried her on ancestral land at Rangitukia on the East Coast of New Zealand , 
Ben Fawkes "Family set to apply to have body exhumed" ( I 4 December 2007) Th e Dominion Post 
Wellington , at http://www.stuff.co.nz 
5 1 Ben Fawkes "Family set to apply to have body exhumed" (14 December 2007) The Dominion Post 
Wellington , at hllp://www.stuff.co.nz (as stated by Ruatoria Sergeant , Hone Hercwini) 
52 Burial and Cremation Act 1964, s.51 (I) 
53 To commit an offence the body must be buried by a person and then be unlawfully exhumed 
pursuant to Burial and Cremation Act 1964, s.55 or be unlawfully buried by an individual pursuant to 
Burial and Cremation Act 1964, s.54 
5
~ Burial and Cremation Act, s.55 
55 Heather du Plessis-Allan "Feud Over Body Intensifies" above n 51 
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There are several reasons which favour the evaluation of current testamentary law. 
Firstly, as stated by Russell Scott, "without a proper evaluation of the Jaws 
surrounding body parts and tissue, grave social damage could ensue and unacceptable 
practices may be solidified."56 Although speaking in favour of legislative clarification 
for medical and scientific use, Scott's argument has particular relevance for the 
cadavers at the centre of death rituals. If the law in this area is not subject to 
evaluation, the unauthorised removal and retention of bodies is likely to reoccur 
because anguished family members may see this as a viable means of securing 
possess10n. 
Secondly, Scott argues that allowing the legal status of the human body to remain 
unexamined may be detrimental to the reputation of people involved when disputes 
arise. 57 Whilst Scott uses the example of a medical practitioner facing homicide 
investigations or a civil action in regard to medical treatment of a deceased patient; 
the same argument is also applicable to the actions or inactions of the funeral director, 
executor, police and relatives of the deceased when an unauthorised removal occurs. 
Similar to the unauthorised removal of a corpse, Scott argues that there are polarised 
views of organ usage and control. As demonstrated in the three recent cases, one side 
often argues for the "personal autonomy"58 of the deceased individual ,59 whilst the 
other side argues for the collective or community good irrespective of the individual' s 
views.60 Scott argues that in the case of organ donation, the former view may 
contravene the wishes of the deceased ' s family but the later may fail to protect the 
interests of the indivi_dual. 61 This argument too can be applied to human burials where 
the views of the deceased individual and family are at variance, or where family 
members of the deceased have different cultural values with regards to interment. 
Scott argues that more robust Jaws are required to obviate such disputes.62 
56 Russell Scott, The Body as Property (The Viking Press, New York, 1981 ), 66 
57 Ibid, 
58 Ibid, 91 
59 For e11ample, in the case or Ivy May Ngahooro the deceased included in her will that she intended to 
be buried in Hamilton . Her executor and niece, name, was attempting to recovery the body to achieve 
this burial ; Belinda Feek '"Snatched' body returned to family' ' (07 March 2008) Waikato Tim es at 
http://www.stuff.co.nz 
60 Russell Scott, above n 57, 91 ; 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid . 
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D Conclusion 
To conclude, it is important that the executor's common Jaw right to possession and 
his or her power as nominee pursuant to the Human Tissue Act 2008 are usually 
sufficient for interment of the deceased in accordance with stipulated burial wishes. 
However, it must be also recognised that even in cases where the deceased's body is 
not removed, executoriaJ powers are subject to other limitations, such as those 
contained in the Administration Act 1964 and the Coroners Act 2006. A deceased' s 
burial wishes may also be limited by the executor's discretionary power and, in some 
cases, the interests of the relatives. In cases where there is an unauthorised removal, 
the executor's right to possession has proved to be insufficient when attempting to 
fulfil the burial wishes of the deceased. 
11 
III THE BODY AS PROPERTY 
A Property Rights in a Corpse - the Practical Effect 
The three recent cases of corpse removal have brought into question the legal power 
of an executor to retain or recover a corpse. Subsequently, many involved parties 
such as affected families, funeral directors and some legal professionals have 
suggested vesting property rights in a body may be the legal solution.63 
If an executor were to be given property rights to the testator's corpse under 
consideration, the practical effect would be that the corpse would be legally capable 
of being stolen. Pursuant to section 219(1) of the Crimes Act 1961, the person who 
removed the body would have committed the criminal offence of theft as he or she 
would have taken or dealt with the body without consent64 and with the intent to 
permanently deprive any owner of the body or any interest in the body.
65 ' Intent to 
permanently deprive ' the executor of the body pursuant to section 219(2)(a) would be 
satisfied as the body would be incapable of being returned to the executor "in the 
same condition." 
In accordance with the criminal offence of theft, those who removed a body owned by 
an executor would thus attract the corresponding criminal conviction of imprisonment 
not exceeding seven years,66 and the executor could call upon relevant tortious 
remedies such as suing for conversion. 67 Not only would property ri ghts convey more 
robust remedies to an executor, but the police could also invoke powers of search and 
seizure providing there is a 'reasonable belief' of possession.68 
However, for theft to apply to those who remove and retain a corpse without 
authorisation, the human body must constitute "property."69 Section 2(1) stipulates 
63 Be linda Feek '"S natched' body returned to family" (07 March 2008) Waikato Times at 
http://www.stuff.co. nz; Dr Cordeli a Thomas, Radio NZ Interview; Interview of Simon Manning, 
Funeral Director o f Seddon Park Funeral Parlour (P ippa Wetzel, TV One Breakfast, 7 March 2008) at 
http://tvnz.co. nz/contcnt 
6
~ Crimes Act 1961 , s.2 19(3) - taking docs not inc lude possession by consent 
65 Crimes Act 1961 , s.2 19( I )(a) and (b) 
66 Crimes Act 1961 , s.223(a)-(d) 
67 Interview with Dr Cordelia Thomas, Senior-Legal Advisor for the New Zealand Bioethics Council 
(Kathryn Ryan , Nine to Noon, National - Radio New Zealand, 10 March 2008) at 
http://www.rad ionz.co. nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon 
68 Crimes Act 1961 , s.224( I )(a)( i) 
69 CrimcsAct 1961 ,s.2 19( 1) 
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property to "include real and personal property, and any estate or interest in any real 
or personal property ... and any thing in action, and any other rights or interest."
70 
Whilst it is evident parliament does not intend the Crimes Act to define 'property' 
exhaustively, the common Jaw has generally precluded human tissue from being 
property on the grounds that it is incapable of being owned.
71 
B Common Law Status of the Human Body - "No-Property" 
Haynes's Case is often cited as being the first identifiable cases to articulate the legal 
status of a corpse as 'no-property' .72 The case involved a person who removed from 
several graves, the winding sheets used to wrap the deceased and whether the person 
had 'stolen' the winding sheets from the deceased. It was held that taking the sheets 
could not constitute theft as a deceased person is not capable of owning property.
73 
Magnusson, however, has suggested that the case has been incorrectly applied in 
subsequent cases as authority for that no property rights can subsist in a dead body.
74 
Despite the rule's uncertain legal conception, theorists such as Sir Edward Coke have 
also asserted that because corpse has assumed a spiritual status it is "nullius in bonis" 
or unable to by owned by anyone.75 Subsequently, the rule that "the law recognises 
no property in a corpse"76 has been extended to preclude a person from owning body 
tissue.77 
The reluctance of the legislature and common law to confer property rights upon an 
individual in respect of a human body is likely to be derived from an apprehension 
that a body would become commodified; thus affecting or diminishing the person's 
h d. · 78 own uman 1gmty. 
7° Crimes Act 1961 , s.2( I) 
7 1 Williams v Williams ( 1882) 20 Ch D 659; R v Price ( 1884) 12 QBD 247; Awa v Independent News 
Auckland Ltd [ 1995) 3 NZLR 70 I ; R v Lynn ( 1788) I 00 ER 394; R v Sharpe ( 1857) l 69 ER 959. 
There are some exceptions such as the "work and skills exception·' which will be discussed 
subsequently 
72 M Davies and N Naffine, Are Persons Property?: Legal debates about property and personality 
(Ashgate, England, 200 I), I 06 
73 Hayne's Case (1614) 77 ER 1389, 1389 
74 Magnusson R, 'The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in Common Law 
Jurisdictions ." ( 1992) 18 Melb U LR 60 I at 603 
75 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England Part Ill (Thames Basel, London, 1680) 203 
76 R v Sharpe 169 ER 959,960 
77 Moore v Regents, 487 
78 Dr Cordelia Thomas Interview above n 5 
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C Exceptions to the 'No-Property' Rule - The 'Work and Skills' Exception 
Although it is well established that no one may own a corpse or body tissue, the courts 
have allowed a limited number of exceptions. The seminal case of Doodleward v 
Spence created an exception to the no-property rule where a person had employed 
skill and labour with respect to a corpse.79 In this case, the courts justified according 
property rights with respect to a stillborn two-headed foetus because a person 
formally in possession of the corpse had exercised skill and labour in its 
preservation. 80 As held by Griffith CJ; 81 
when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with a human body or part 
of a human body in his lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiating it 
from a mere corpse awaiting burial , he acquires a right to retain possession of it, al least as 
against any person not entitled to have it delivered to him for the purpose of burial. . . 
In contrast to this, Gibson LJ in a later case disagreed that preservation of human 
tissue could legally transform it to constitute property. In Dobson v North Tyneside 
Health Authority, he stated that preservation of the deceased 's brain was not 
analogous to embalming a corpse or preserving an anatomical specimen and so can 
not be accorded property status on the basis of the "work and skills exception". 
82 This 
demonstrates that a fairly high standard of skill and labour must be employed before 
human tissue can become to subject of property. 
D Historical Exceptions 
Whilst it is now well-established that humans are incapable of constituting property, 
most cultures have a history of human ownership.83 Russell Scott describes historical 
slavery as "institutionalised" and "sophisticated" because it used social, legal and 
economic mechanisms present in society to maintain its system.
84 
19 Doodleward v Spence ( 1908) 6 CLR 406; sec also In re Organ Retention Croup Litigation [2004) 
EWHC 644 (QB) [para 148] 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, 414 
82 Dobson and another v North Tyneside Health Authority and another [ 19961 4 All ER 474 (CA) Peter 
Gibson LJ 
83 Ancient Romans could own ' potestas' and their progeny - Davies and Naffine above n 72 ; Russian 
landowners owned serfs until the Emancipation Reform of 1861 ; the Slavery Abolition Act was 
enforced throughout the majority of the British colony in 1833. 
84 Russell Scott, above n 57 , 27 
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I "Body-snatching" and the Anatomy Act 1832 
Until a revival of anatomical study during the Renaissance era, studies of the human 
body conducted during the 2nd century formed the majority information accessed by 
early anatomists. However, during the l 6'h and 17th Centuries, the way in which 
anatomical study was conducted changed significantly, bringing a greater focus to the 
human body and its components as it exists rather than the human body as a vague 
and abstracted concept. 85 
This new prevailing perception of how the human body should be studied created the 
need for a consistent supply of subjects. The dissection of human corpses was seen as 
the most effective and least harmful means of discovering anatomical systems and 
their function within the human body. In response to this need, King Henry VIII 
granted the Edinburgh Guild of Surgeons and Barbers the "annual right" to the bodies 
of four hanged felons. 86 Subsequently, the number of cadavers supplied was 
increased and the laws changed so that the corpses of convicted murders sentenced to 
execution were conferred for dissection. 87 
This supply, however, failed to satisfy the growing number of corpses required by the 
medical profession; people then began exhuming the graves of the recently deceased 
and selling their corpses. As Ruth Richardson suggests, the increase in anatomical 
study is the "probable catalyst" for the commodification of the corpse88 
Despite body snatching being a discrete and largely isolated demand for human tissue 
in Western history, 89 the events of the 18111 and l 9th Century are highly popularised 
because of the peculiar status of the corpse at common law. Because cadavers are 
incapable of being owned, a body snatcher often evaded criminal liability for his or 
her actions as no offence of theft could be committed.90 
85 Ruth Richardson Death, Dissections and the Destitute (Penguin , London, 1989) 32 
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid , 55 
89 Russel Scott, above n 57 , 12 
90 Ibid , 58-59 
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In response to body-snatching, the legislature enacted the Anatomy Act 1832 to 
ensure an alternative and abundant source of cadavers for medical research and 
dissection. It allowed for medical researchers to use the 'unclaimed' corpses from 
public workhouses for dissection and study.9 1 The Act is very important because it 
highlights that the "inherent value" of the human body, as evinced by its 'no-property' 
status, has not always been treated consistently by the legal system. Indeed Ruth 
Richardson concedes that the Act was not designed to limit the effects of anatomical 
research to those who did not have a grieving family, rather those who were unable to 
pay for funeral expenses and resorted to a parish burial; "it was an economic decision" 
to provide the bodies of paupers than those who lacked a grieving family . 92 
However, the retention of "unclaimed" corpses pursuant to the new legislation did not 
in fact extend to property rights, rather provided the medical profession with use of a 
corpse for a period of six weeks after which time the remains were required to be 
buried.93 
9 1 Ruth Richardson , above n 86, 121 
92 Ibid , 186 
93 Ibid, 243 
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IV THE COMMON LAW CONCEPT OF PROPERTY 
Whilst much thought and debate has been expended in the hope of decisively 
conceptualising property, there is still "no universal definition"
94 or checklist of 
elements that will, once satisfied, accord an individual property rights with respect to 
an object. This section will seek to highlight some of the main conceptualisations of 
property and determine whether a corpse is capable of fitting within these 
descriptions. 
A Property as a Social Contract and the Regulation of Relationships 
Thomas Hobbes is cited as one of the original modern-day property theorists.
95 His 
theories attempted to describe property as an instrument of social control. People, as 
Hobbes asserted, had an inherent need for power and control over things in their 
environment; but it was reason which motivated people to achieve these needs 
through constructed property norms.
96 Hobbes argued that a strong government and 
legal system created an environment that was conducive to social cultivation.
97 
Therefore, people necessarily prescribed to legal norms such as property they were an 
efficient way of achieving a better way of life. 
Hobbes ' rationale is well-suited to the current scenario because property rights would 
regulate the way in which an executor and the deceased's family interacted. 
According to Hobbes' theory, vesting property rights in an executor would stabilise 
social relationships and create a more 'civilised' funeral procedure. 
F. W . Rudrrun also extends Hobbes' paradigm by specifying 'dorrunance' in social 
relationships as being a key motivation for property. As he contends, "ownership 
entails not only a private relationship between a person as owner and the property 
owned, but also an interpersonal, social relationship between the person as owner and 
other persons as non-owners."
98 The relationship of particular importance to Rudmin 
94 C.M. Thomas A Framewordfor the Collectio11, Retention, and Use of Human Body Parts (Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2006), 10 
95 F Rudmin Ownership as Interpersonal Dominance: A History and Three Studies of rhe Social 
Psychology of Property (Queens University, Ontario, 1988) 
96 lbid 
97 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, eh. 46, p. 666 as cited in Robert P . Kraynak "Hobbes on Barbarism and 
Civilization" in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 45, No. I (February 1983) 86, 90 
98 F Rudmin above n 96, 61 
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is dominance or 'control of people' as it has historically been considered a particular 
attribute of possession and ownership.99 Effectively, property rights would result in 
the executor having dominance during the interment process as interference with his 
or her rights would result in criminal liability pursuant to section 219(1) of the Crimes 
Act 1961. 
B Property as an Exclusive Right 
Renowned English jurist and philosopher, William Blackstone described property as 
"the sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the uni verse." 100 Salient in this famed quote is the authoritarian and exclusivity of 
property as a legal concept. Davies and Naffine state that, " [i]n one condensed 
thought, [Blackstone 's] evocation of the absolute brings together the elements of 
exclusion, individual sovereignty ... and assured individual identity in the figure of the 
'one man."' 101 Whilst Blackstone's description of property may not reflect the extent 
of property rights with perfect symmetry, the concept of property as private control 
and autonomy has been very influential throughout Western political institutions.
102 In 
conjunction with alienation, the exclusive possession of an object is considered to be 
one of the key features of property.
103 
Indeed, common law property rights, although subject to restrictions, would confer 
upon the executor rights in rem or rights to the deceased's body. Rights in rem would 
allow an executor to achieve the deceased's burial wishes because they provide 
paramount control of the body against all other people including the deceased 's 
family. 
C The Effect of Property - Honore's 'Bundle of Rights' 
Rather than attempting to explain the motivations for property, British lawyer and 
jurist A. M. Honore intended to describe property in terms of its practical effect on the 
individual. One of the most prevailing modern day property paradigms is Honore's 
99 lbid . 
100 Williams Blackstone Commentaries on the laws of England, bk. 2, eh. 32, p. 508 
10 1 Davies and Naffine, above n 73, 34 - 35 
102 Ibid , 35 
103 AM Honere 'Ownership' in AG Guest (eel) Oxford Essays in Jurispruden ce (Oxford University 
Press , Ox ford , 1961) I 13 
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'Bundle of Rights' which demarcates eleven rights which indicate a person's property 
· · h b" 104 rnterest wit respect to an o Ject. The rights include the right to exclusively 
possess, enjoy, manage, alienate, to capital and to security, transmissibility (bequest) 
and the right to secure possession; but whilst they culminate to describe property 
relations, none are actually necessary to have legal recognition of a property right.
105 
As Davies and Naffine describe, these rights are merely incidental to a declaration by 
the Jaw that a particular right is a property right.
106 
One must, therefore, question the extent to which these rights play a part in legally 
determining a person's property right with respect to an object. Almost all examples 
of ownership are subject to diffusion, and yet the courts still hold Honere's bundle of 
rights to be indicative of property. In Moore v Regents of the University of California, 
for example, Justice PaneJli' s declined to accord property rights to Moore with respect 
to his excised body tissue for reasons including Californian legislation relevant to the 
disposal of human tissue after an operation eliminated "so many of the rights 
ordinarily attached to prope1ty that one [could not] simply assume that what [ was] left 
amount[ed] to 'property' or 'ownership' for the purposes of conversion law."
107 
And whilst Justice Mosk in his dissenting judgment argued that property rights can be 
of variable intensity, he did not deny that the most crucial of these rights need to be 
retained in order to legaJly identify a property right. Mosk cites a passage in People v 
Walker iri which the judge likens the ' bundle of rights' to a tree that is able to retain 
its legal status despite being severely pruned.
108 One would argue that this metaphor 
has been used because it has prescribed limits; a tree cannot survive or be identified as 
a tree if it is cut back to the base of its trunk. Indeed the same must have been 
intended for property. A crucial element of one's property interest must be retained in 
order for property to still exist. 
If the legislature were to alter the concept of property to include dead bodies for 
burial, restrictions to an executor's "bundle of rights" would be imperative. One such 
104 Ibid. 
IOS ibid. 107- 147 
106 M Davies and N Naffinc, above n 73, 37 
107 Moore v Regent of California 793 P 2d 479, 492 (Cal 1990) as per Panelli J 
108 Ibid , 5 l 0 
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right is that of alienation, which may be removed without altering one's ability to 
"own" something at common Jaw. In Mabo v Queensland, Brennan J held that the 
inalienability of customary land should not deny its inhabitants the right to claim 
ownership. He stated; 109 
[L]and in the exclusive possession of an indigenous people is not, in any private law sense, 
alienable property ... there is no reason why that title should not be recognised as a burden of 
the Crown's radical title. 
This proposition may be argued in favour of property rights for an executor. 
According to Brennan J, ownership can still endure even if fundamental property 
rights are restricted or even altogether destroyed. However, if an executor's right to 
the deceased's body became a 'property right', severe restrictions would need to be 
imposed to ensure the executor did not use those rights in a way that was inconsistent 
with the deceased's bodily dignity and the relatives interests. For example, an 
executor would be prohibited from alienating, using, and bequeathing the body to 
another person after he or she dies. The executor's "immunity from expropriation"' 
10 
(right to security) would also be disabled, along with a right to income and capital 
from the body. The cumulative effect of such restrictions would render the executor's 
proprietary right unrecognisable. 
The only right required by the executor in cases of unauthorised removal of the body 
is the right to possession because it is protected by the criminal offence of theft. 
Therefore, if the legislature is intending to reinforce an executor's testamentary right 
to possession; all that is required is a criminal offence to be created which enables the 
body to be recovered by the police. 
D Property as Ownership of the Market Value of an Object 
Whilst property is often conceptualised by a layperson as the object owned by 
someone, the legal concept of property as a 'bundle of rights' describes the 
relationship between an object and the person who proclaims to own it. French 
economist and libertarian, Frederic Ba tiat progre sed this notion one step further by 
109 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) ( 1992) 175 CLR J, 36 as per Brennan J 
110 I. Goold , "Sounds Suspciously like Property Treatment" in The Mind, the Body and the Law 
(Halstead Press, Sydney, 2007), 76 
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asserting that a proprietor simply has ownership of the market value of the object 
owned. As asserted in his main treatise on property, Economic Harmonies: 111 
In their relation to one another, men are owners only of value, and value represents only 
services that are compared and voluntarily rendered and received. [O]n the one hand , this is 
the true meaning of the word value; and that, on the other, men never arc, never can be, 
owners of anything except value, a conclusion to be drawn from logic as well as from 
experience. 
And indeed, inextricably woven into the legal and layman's property paradigm is the 
notion of value as a means of justifying property demarcation and quantifying the 
corresponding punitive measures for theft. For example, in some countries, human 
blood has become an object to which property rights may be attached. In Green v 
Commissioner, the United States Tax Court determined that the taxpayer's rare type 
A-B-negative blood to be a "tangible product" for the purpose of attracting taxation 
when sold. 112 Whilst property rights are generally precluded from being attached to 
the human body and body parts, blood has been deemed an exception in the United 
States on the basis that it has a market value. In New Zealand, trading in blood and 
other controlled substances is prohibited 113 unless an exemption is obtained from the 
Minister of Health. 114 
Another case which reaffirms this point is the aforementioned Dooclleward v Spence. 
In Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority, Peter Gibson LJ mused that the foetus 
in the Dooclleward acquired a "pecuniary value" through work and skill performed on 
it, and it was this transformative value which justified an action in detinue. 11 5 
Another example of the value element that subsists within the property paradigm is 
the criminal punishment for theft. Pursuant to section 223 of the Crimes Act 1961 , 
punishment is determined by the value of the object stolen. Depending on the expense 
111 Frederic Bastiat, Economic Harmonies (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, 1996) Ch 8, para 34- 35 
in hllp://www.cconlib.org/li brary/Bastiat/ 
11 2 Green v Commissioner74 TC. 1229 (1980) 
11 3 Human Tissue Act 2008, s.56 
114 Human Tissue Act 2008, s.60 
11 5 Dobson and another v North Tyneside Health A11thoriry and another [ 19961 4 All ER 474 (CA) 
Peter Gibson LJ , 
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of an item, a person who steals may receive anywhere between less than three months 
and up to seven years. 116 
According an executor property rights to a corpse can not be easily reconciled with 
the notion of market value for two practical reasons. Firstly, it would be very difficult 
to quantify the economic value of that body without recognising the illegal market 
value of human tissue. Although section 56 of the Human Tissue Act 2008 reaffirms 
that trading in human tissue is generally prohibited by Jaw, the valuation of the human 
body as determined by an international private and illegal market still arguably 
persists. Russell Scott states that, " [d]ead or alive, the human body now has an 
intrinsic value. To be precise, that value inheres not in the body as an entity but in its 
component patts" 11 7 In order to recognise an executor's rights to a corpse as being 
property rights, one must acknowledge the illegal value of its "component parts." 
Without such a valuation, the Crimes Act punishment for theft is unworkable. 
Secondly, recognising the market value of an executor's property rights would require 
the courts to make difficult decisions when convicting a person of theft. For example, 
if the deceased suffered from cancer his or her organs may not be worth as much as a 
person in full health. Because punishment for theft is based on the monetary value of 
the object stolen, a person convicted of theft may be punished with less or greater 
severity depending on the economic value of the corpse stolen. This would be an 
unfavourable outcome, patticularly when attributing property rights have been 
suggested as a means of protecting the human integrity and autonomy of the person 
who has died. However, these reasons do not preclude a body from being 
conceptualised as property; they instead highlight that it would be a digression from 
the current legislative formulation of property. 
E Property as an Expression of the Individual 
As suggested by Sarah Cooper, "[a]ll forms of property, tangible, and intangible, 
covered by property law contribute to a persons' identity" 11 8 As mentioned earlier in 
this paper, the testamentary will is also underpinned by liberal perceptions of 
116 Crimes Act 1961 , s.223 (a) - (d) 
11 7 Russe ll Scott, above n , 3 
118 Sarah Webster Cooper "Rites , Rights, Writing: Tintcrn Abbey" in Death Rites and Rights, above n 
I, 135- 136 
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individual autonomy and identity. In light of this commonality, it is not surprising 
that some people have advanced property as being the best means of securing a 
testator's burial wishes. 
Legal theorist and political philosopher, John Locke justified property as a way of 
reflecting one's autonomy and human dignity. In his well-known Two Treatises of 
Government, Locke stated that; 11 9 
"Through the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his 
Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his ." 
Subsumed in this quote is, firstly, the notion that individual autonomy and identity is 
expressed through an ownership of oneself and that necessarily rejects the idea of a 
person being the property of another. Secondly, the use of one's labour and skill with 
respect to an object justifies ownership of the external world. As Davies and Naffine 
describe, "[s]elf-ownership therefore provides a foundation for ownership of the 
external world." 120 
According to Locke's theory, a person may justify property rights with respect to an 
object, either because his or her work and skill (and, therefore, individual identity) has 
been employed or because the object is the person's body. Neither rationale for 
property can be used to justify or explain an executor's proprietary right to a corpse. 
It should be noted, however, that the argument of individual autonomy and identity 
has been advanced by legal professions who are in favour of according property rights 
to a person with respect to his or her body tissue. 121 This argument normally arises in 
cases where tissue is removed from a living person and used in a manner inconsistent 
with his or her interests. The aforementioned case of Moore v Regents is a well-
known example of such an occurrence. 
11 9 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, Ch V, para 27 , 287 - 288 
120 Davies and Naffine, above n 73 , 4 
12 1 C.M. Thomas A Fram eword for rhe Co/Leer ion, Retenrio11, and Use of Human Body Parrs (Victoria 
University of Wellington, 2006), above n 95 
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It appears in these circumstances are much better suited to many of the property 
paradigms previously discussed. For example, in her article, "Sound Suspiciously 
Like Property Treatment," Imagen Goold convincingly demonstrates how human 
tissue may be accorded property status, and that Honore's 'bundle of rights' such as 
that of possession, use, management and income can be and, in some cases, already 
attributed to human tissue in many circumstances without legal illogicality. 122 Goold 
also argues that property rights have been awarded with respect to confined types of 
human tissue such as blood and cell lines because it reflects how society views these 
objects - as items of property. 123 
Thomas proposes property rights to be accorded to an individual's body in 
conjunction with "reasonable restrictions" once its constituent parts have been 
excised. 124 Prope1ty rights are argued by Thomas as a "better alternative" to the 
current legal situation because they allow for a degree of control over body parts once 
in the hands of others, and prevent a "degradation of personhood" by protecting 
autonomy. 125 
Whilst Locke's theory cannot justify an executor's proprietary right, it can justify the 
testator's proprietary right to his or her own body. If the legislature was to alter the 
legal status of human tissue so that every person owned his or her body, the logical 
progression of this would be that the executor could be conferred the testator's 
property rights to his or her body, in conjunction with the rest of the testamentary 
estate. 
122 Imogen Goold, above n J 11 , 67 - 82 
123 Ibid , 66 
124 CM. Thomas A Frameword for the Collection, Retention, and Use of Human Body above n 95, 7 
125Ibid 
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V EXAMINATION OF MAORI DEATH RITUAL 
The examination of a multicultural society typically highlights a diverse range of 
responses towards death. 126 Because each of the three aforementioned cases of 
unauthorised removal involved a conflict between Maori and Pakeha cultural practice; 
social and cultural beliefs regarding the treatment of the dead are relevant for 
determining whether the human body deserves property demarcation. As stated by 
Cordelia Thomas; 127 
New Zealand differs from other jurisdictions, in that Maori values are valued and respected, 
but there has been scant academic debate considering how Maori value about body parts might 
fit into a western individualistic paradigm. 
Firstly, it is important to note that whilst procedure in Maori death rituals is often 
prescribed by the particular customs of each hapu or iwi, the general duties and 
expectations which attach to death and grieving are similar throughout Maori 
. 128 society. 
A Tikanga 1l1aori and Customary Burial Ritual 
As described by the New Zealand Law Commission, "'custom law ' is used as a 
phrase to describe the body of rules developed by indigenous societies to govern 
themselves." 129 Whilst there is no perfect equivalent of 'custom law', "tikanga" is 
often used to describe the practices and underlying values regulating traditional Maori 
society. 130 
Four of the maJor values which interweave to create tikanga Maori include 
whanaungatanga, mana, tapu, utu, and kaitiakitanga. 131 Whanaungatanga is the most 
"pervasive" of all tikanga Maori values because it acknowledges the importance of 
126 Daniel Miller and Fiona Parrott, "Death, Ritual and Material Culture in South London" in Death 
Rites and Rights above n I , 148 
127 C.M. Thomas A Frameword for the Collection, Reten tion, and Use of Human Body Parts above n 
95,5 
128 Paratcne Ngata, "Death, Dying and Grief' in M Schwass (ed), Last Words: Approaches to Death in 
New Zealand's Cultures and Faiths (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2005) 29 
129 New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (Study Paper 9, 
Wellington March 200 I) para 67 
130 Ibid, para 68 
131 Ibid, para 125. This is not an exhaustive list of values, and the particularities or each value differ 
slightly in each iwi . 
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relationships in Maori society. 132 Whilst this includes relationships between people, 
it also denotes the relationship with one's whakapapa or ancestry, the spiritual world, 
and nature. 133 In accordance with the principle of whanaungatanga; 
the individual was important as a member of a co llective [in traditional Maori society]. The 
individual identity was defined through that individual 's relati onships with others. It follows 
that tikanga Maori emphasised the responsibility owed by the individual to the eollective. 134 
In relation to whanaungatanga, Williams and Hohepa contrast the general treatment of 
a corpse after death by both Maori and Pakeha cultures (as determined by the Law of 
Succession and disposition). Unlike the common law, which accords disposition of 
the body to one's surviving spouse, children, or executor in instances of a will, 
tikanga Maori denotes a dead body to be a taonga (treasure) of the deceased's greater 
social arrangement. 135 For particularly prominent Maori, multiple iwi of the deceased 
may become involved with the burial ceremony. 136 In is clear from this description 
that the communality of Maori burial practice is at odds with common Jaw rules of 
disposition. It may also be argued that property rights, an even more robust form of 
exclusive possession, would contravene the collective nature of Maori burial practice 
to a greater extent than already experienced. 
B The Spirituality of Maori Death Ritual 
Ngata explains that, "[a] person who has died is a link between the living and the 
dead; people also grieve for those who have passed on earlier. The tangi and 
poroporoaki are given in the belief that the deceased will communicate these greetings 
to others in the spirit world." 137 
He continues to explain that although death is an inevitable part of life, "decisions 
regarding the tangihanga and burial [in Maori society] are "hotly debated because 
they are so final." 138 This does not mean, however, that the unauthorised removal and 
132 Ibid , para 130 
133 Ibid . 
134 Ibid. 
135 P Hohepa & D Williams The Taking into Account of Te Ao Maori in Relation to Reform of the Law 
of Succession (Law Commission, Wellington. February 1996) para 19 
136 Ibid. 
137 P Ngata, above n 129 33 
138 P Ngata , above n 129, 32 
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retention of a deceased's family member is common Maori practice when disputes 
arise over burial of the body. When speaking to Te Karere, Te Wahapa Hurst stated 
that the unauthorised removal of a body is not in keeping with traditional Maori 
practice; rather a process of negotiation and consultation between the families should 
occur. 139Therefore, allowing for an incorporation of tikanga Maori into the burial 
ritual of a bicultural family member would not permit the removal of the body without 
the consent of other family members. As highlighted, Maori burial often involves a 
process of negotiation, particularly when family members belong to different hapu or 
. · 140 
lWl. 
Ngata also describes the divergence between the legal requirements imposed on a 
body such as a coroner's inquest and traditional Maori death ritual. Many Maori are 
opposed to the removal of body tissue after death as it contravenes their spiritual 
k · 141 practice of returning to papatuanu u rntact. The sterile environment in which 
medical procedures are carried out in are also at odds with Maori death ritual because 
they believe that the body of the deceased should be constantly attended by others 
before burial has occurred. 142 
C Treaty of Waitangi 
Because concerns regarding the adequacy of the executor's possessory right to the 
testator's body have arisen in the context of Maori-Pakeha intercultural disputes, the 
Treaty of Waitangi is an important factor if law reform is to occur. As stated by 
Chilwell J in Huakina Development Trust; 143 
[t]here can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of New Zealand society. It follows 
that is part of the context in which legislation which impinges upon its principles is to be 
interpreted when it is proper, in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation, to 
have resort to extrinsic material. 
139 Te Wahapa Hurst (Te Karere) in Li a Owen "Stand Off After Body Snatch" (6 March 2008) 6pm 
One News Report 
140 Ibid; also above n 132 
141 P Ngata, above n 129, 33 
14 2 Ibid. 
143 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [ 1987) 2 NZLR 188, 210 per Chi I well J 
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FoJJowing rejection of the Treaty as a "simple nullity," 144much disagreement has 
emerged concerning the effect of the Treaty on the rights and responsibilities agreed 
to by both the Crown and Maori. 145 The majority of debate has arisen out of an 
acknowledgement that te reo and english versions of the Treaty are very divergent it 
their descriptions of the rights and obligations assented to by each party. For 
example, the te reo version saw the Maori signatories ceding 'kawanatanga,' 146 or 
governorship, to the Crown in return for retaining te tino rangatiratanga 
147 which has 
been translated by Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu as being an "unqualified exercise of 
their Chieftanship [ over their villages and ... treasures ... ]" 148 In contrast, the english 
version appears to use these terms in the opposite context. 
In accordance with contra proferentem, the international Jaw convention of contract 
interpretation, the Treaty of Waitangi is interpreted in a manner consistent with its te 
reo translation because Maori were the party seeking to rely on the document. 149 
Subsequently, the treaty has been determined by Dr Janine Hayward to hold four 
reconciling principles, 11 ••• of active protection, the tribal right to self-regulation, the 
right of redress for past breaches, and the duty to consult. 11150 It is, therefore, the 
recognition and protection of treaty principles such as 'self-regulation' and the 'duty 
to consult' which serves to uphold tikanga Maori. As stated by Hohepa and WiJJiams, 
"the Treaty is central to Maori succession issues in that Article 1 and 2 [ of the Treaty] 
confirms Maori rights to maintain and support tikanga." 151 
1 Waitangi Tribunal 
In 1986, the then current Waitangi Tribunal Chairperson identified Treaty claims to 
include, " ... the maintenance of Maori language, customs, tradition and identity, not 
just the freedom to indulge in customary practices but, according to the claims, the 
144 Wi Parat a v Bishop of Wellington ( 1877) I NZLRLC J 4, para 8 Prendergast CJ 
145 New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law above n J 30 para 
337 
146 Waitangi Tribunal Article One Maori Version of the Treaty of Waitangi www.waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/maori (accessed on 28 August 2008) 
147 Waitangi Tribunal Article Two Maori Version of the Treaty of Waitangi www. waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz/trcaty/maori (accessed on 28 August 2008) 
148 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1994 J I NZLR 513 (PC) 
149 Waitangi Tribunal Motunui Waitara Report www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/ (accessed 28 
August 2008) 
150 Waitangi Tribunal Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi http://www. waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz/treaty/principles (accessed 28 August 2008) 
151 P Hohepa & D Williams above n 136, para 12 
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right to the state assisted propagation of them." 152 The Waitangi Tribunal is 
responsible for determining whether individual claims are inconsistent with the 
"principles" of the Treaty. One treaty principle central to the context of burial is the 
promise of protection of Maori custom and values. 153 Accordingly, any Jaw reform 
pertaining to executorial rights over the deceased 's body should consider protecting 
Maori burial customs and incorporating a degree of self-governance for Maori to 
carry out burial arrangements in accordance with customary practice. If this does not 
occur, the Waitangi Tribunal may investigate and make recommendations regarding 
any legislative reform determined to be inconsistent with Treaty principles. 154 
Further argument in favour of incorporating tikanga Maori into succession law subsist 
in the case of Attorney-General v New Zealand Maori Council. This case held that 
Treaty principles may still be a relevant consideration when exercising a discretionary 
power (such as those of an executor when burying the testator's body), even if the 
power does not stipulate an express reference to the Treaty is required. 155 
In addition to this, the Muriwhenua Land Report held that, "[t]he Tribunal has drawn 
attention ... to the importance of decision-makers giving equal weight to the Maori 
worldview, the Maori value system, and Maori law and policies." 156 This suggests 
that an executor dealing with the body of a person who was both Maori and Pakeha 
should give equal weight to both sets of cultural practices. 
D Laws of Succession in regard to Tikanga Maori 
In their report, "The Taking into Account of Te Ao Maori in Relation to Reform of 
the Law of Succession," Hohepa and Williams sought to identify the areas of law 
which "are likely to be a major concern for Maori" 157 As a result, the paper identifies 
the Administration Act 1969 as an example of a statutory regime which is 
dissatisfactory for Maori, firstly, because it conflicts with Maori practices and Jaws, 
158 
152 ET Durie "The Waitangi Tribunal: Its Relationship with the Judicial System" ( 1986) NZLJ 235, 236 
153 New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law above n 130 para 
339 
154 Waitangi Tribunal Act 1975, s.5(1)(a) 
155 Attorney-General v New Zealand Maori Council [ 1991] 2 NZLR 129 
156 New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law above n 130 para 
344 
157 P Hohcpa & D Williams above n 136 para 2 
158 Ibid , para 5 
and secondly, it can be seen by Maori as a breach of the Treaty because it does not 
.d f M . i s9 prov1 e · or aon autonomy. The paper also acknowledges that without 
recognising the inherent differences between Maori and Pakeha perspectives of 
succession, issues with the current law, such as an executor' s sole right to possession 
of a corpse, cannot be effectively resolved. 160 
159 Ibid, para 13 
160 Ibid , para 6 
30 
VI CONCLUSION - STATUTORY REFORM 
Upon analysis of the executor's current testamentary powers and some of the key 
western Jaw property paradigms, it appears inappropriate to accord property rights to 
an executor in respect of the testator's body. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that in 
most cases the testamentary powers of an executor are sufficient for achieving the 
burial wishes of the deceased. It is also important to note that the executor's powers, 
are not absolute, rather are subject to different statutory regimes and, therefore, the 
testator's right to his or her desired burial is not automatic. The discretionary nature 
of executoriaJ powers is also another impediment to a testator achieving his or her 
specified burial. 
In cases where the testator's body is removed without authorisation, it has been shown 
that the current testamentary powers of possession are insufficient when the executor 
is trying to recover the body for burial. Although law reform in this area would be 
beneficial, according property rights to an executor is not appropriate for two reasons. 
Firstly, although social regulation would justify property rights in such a 
circumstance, according property rights would be subject to so many restrictions it 
would become unrecognisable as 'property'. Out of the eleven incidents of property, 
exclusive possession and the corresponding right to recovery is all that is needed for 
an executor to achieve his or her testamentary objective. Secondly, there is no 
justification for awarding property rights to an executor according to Locke's property 
paradigm unless the legislature altered the status of the human body so that every 
person could own his or her own body. 
FinaJJy, it is important that any statutory reform take into consideration tikanga Maori 
and afford protection to tradition Maori burial practice as assured by the Treaty of 
Waitangi. As stated by the New Zealand Law Commission; 
161 
Increasingly over the last twenty years there has been a discernible push from Maori and other 
quarters for Maori custom law lo be applied in a number of different areas of general law, 
including family law, criminal justice, and administration of land. The principal source of the 
demand is the Maori determination to use structures and processes that arc essentially Maori 
in managing things Maori. 
161 New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law above n 130 para 
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This 'push' is evident in the recent Human Tissue Act 2008 and the Coroners Act 
2006 which both recognise and give greater protection to the spiritual and cultural 
interests of the deceased's family. 
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